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I. Introduction 
Consider this scenario: an automatic Apple iPhone update 
deletes all of Jane’s text messages. Jane’s iPhone is wiped clean, 
and there is nothing she can do to get her text messages back. 
Apple will quickly send out a carefully crafted apology, which 
subtly points out that Jane accepted the risk of this happening due 
to some obscure provision in their terms of service she never read. 
This rings hollow, though, because Jane still feels like she lost 
something of value, something she owned. Even though they were 
just words on a screen, Jane’s text messages were a little bit more 
than that to her—they felt like a part of who Jane is and who she 
was.  
These text messages were more than just data and binary 
code. They contained Jane’s personal information and 
correspondence with friends and family over the years. To Jane, 
those virtual text messages felt like her property; she had created 
the outgoing messages and received the incoming messages. Even 
if she clicked away her right to pursue contractual remedies by 
accepting Apple’s terms of service, is there anything Jane can do? 
As of today, the answer is a resounding “no.”1 Jane would be 
surprised to learn that she cannot successfully sue Apple for 
                                                                                                     
 1. Infra Part IV.A. 
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deleting her text messages because her text messages are not 
considered personal property. Because text messages are not a 
“property,” she would not be able to successfully bring a conversion 
or trespass claim, despite the elements of both claims being met.2 
Instead, Jane would be limited to a breach of contract claim, 
limiting her chances of redress for Apple’s deletion of something 
that feels like her personal property.3  
Therein lies the problem: courts do not treat text messages as 
intangible personal property. Authors and recipients of text 
messages have limited recourse against cell phone manufacturers 
or service providers when they “accidentally” delete their users’ 
text messages. Instead, courts consider text messages to be the 
product of the contract for services between the cell phone user and 
the cell phone provider. Put another way, because text messages 
would not exist but-for a cellular service contract, they are not 
considered property. Under this “contractually created right” 
theory, text message users can bring an action for a breach of 
contract when their text messages are improperly deleted, but 
that’s about it. Should courts treat text messages as a purely 
contractual right, or should text messages constitute intangible 
personal property capable of being owned? 
This Note argues that text messages are intangible personal 
property. This leads to two practical outcomes. First, text message 
“owners” can successfully sue using property-based causes of 
action (e.g., trespass to chattels and conversion) when their 
ownership rights over their text messages are disturbed by the 
service provider or cell phone manufacturer. Second, the property 
rights inherent in text messages will limit the government’s power 
under the third-party doctrine.  
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II offers a brief overview 
of what text messages are and what they are not. Part III covers 
the history of intangible personal property law and reviews the 
evolution of “cybertrespass” claims. Part IV explores the judiciary 
and the Fourth Amendment’s failure to protect text messages. 
Finally, Part V evaluates whether text messages constitute 
property and the practical implications of this finding. 
                                                                                                     
 2. Infra Part V.A.2. 
 3. Infra Part IV.A.1. 
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II. Text Messages: An Overview 
Text messaging (or texting) is a text-based form of 
communication between cell phone users.4 Text messages, as an 
alternative to e-mails and phone calls,5 are the predominant form 
of communication in society.6 The broad term “text messages” 
encompasses text-only messages sent via Short Messages Service 
(SMS), picture, video and sound messages (multimedia messages 
or MMS), and messages sent through third-party messenger 
applications such as iMessage.7 SMS and MMS messages are 
transmitted from the sender’s cell phone to an SMS tower, which 
then sends the messages to the cell phone service provider’s tower, 
which then dispatches the text message to the recipient’s cell 
phone.8 Messenger applications use cellular provider data 
networks to send text and multimedia messages between mobile 
phone users who possess the same messenger application 
downloaded on their phones.9 
Cell phones are so ingrained in American culture that “[n]o 
one ever leaves the house these days without three things: their 
keys, wallet and mobile [device]. It is, in short, an essential 
lifestyle accessory.”10 Ninety-five percent of American adults own 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (defining 
text messaging). 
 5. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“Text messaging is thus an alternative both to email and to telephone 
calls.”). 
 6. See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing 
the societal shift in Americans’ private communications methods from phone calls 
and letters to text messaging). 
 7. See Moore, 309 F.R.D. at 536 (“Texting originally only referred to 
messages sent using the Short Messages Service (‘SMS’), but now also 
encompasses messages containing media such as pictures, videos, and sounds 
(‘MMS’).”). 
 8. See id. (explaining the route SMS and MMS messages take from the 
sender’s mobile phone to the receiver’s mobile phone). 
 9. See id. (distinguishing iMessage and other messenger services from SMS 
and MMS messages). 
 10. Anthony Patterson, Digital Youth, Mobile Phones and Text Messaging: 
Assessing the Profound Impact of a Technological Afterthought, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO DIGITAL CONSUMPTION 83 (Russell W. Belk & Rosa 
Llamas eds., 2013). 
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a cell phone.11 Nearly three-quarters of American adults who own 
cell phones send and receive text messages.12 Text messaging 
users, on average, send or receive more than forty-one messages 
daily, while cell phone owners make or receive an average of ten 
phone calls daily.13 In short, most Americans own cell phones, and 
Americans use their cell phones to text message more often than 
they do to make phone calls or send e-mails. 
Although the majority of this Note concerns what text 
messages are, it is helpful to narrow the issue’s scope and briefly 
explain what text messages are not. Text messages are not 
physical or tangible objects.14 Text messages are not copyrightable 
and thus not protected by intellectual property law.15 And text 
messages are not e-mails.16  
A. Text Messages Are Not Physical Property nor Are They 
Protected by Copyright 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the intangible data 
and text messages contained within the cell phone from the 
physical, tangible cell phone object. For example, during an arrest, 
the police can search the exterior of a cell phone, but they are 
barred from searching the data housed in the phone.17 Internal cell 
phone data, contained within a “smart” object, carries greater 
constitutional protections than objects held within “simple” 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) 
(detailing trends in mobile phone ownership over time) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
19, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/09/19/americans-and-text-
messaging/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (describing trends in text message usage 
among Americans over time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Infra Part II.A. 
 15. Infra Part II.A. 
 16. Infra Part II.B. 
 17. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 833–34 (2016) (“The physical object 
(the phone) could be searched to ensure, for example, that a razor blade was not 
hidden inside, but the digital content could not be searched without a warrant.”). 
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containers.18 Additionally, although a cell phone owner owns the 
physical device itself, the owner does not own the software 
contained within, as cell phone providers license (rather than sell) 
the software to the cell phone owner for their use.19  
Just as there is a distinction between the ownership of the 
physical phone and the data and software within, there is also a 
distinction between owning the copyright to the contents of a text 
message and owning a copy of the text message itself. This is the 
“copy/copyright” distinction. In relevant part, the Copyright Act20 
states that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material 
object in which the work is embodied.”21 The copy/copyright 
distinction is crucial when establishing ownership rights held in 
an intangible property such as a text message,22 and 
understanding the copy/copyright distinction is necessary for this 
reason: intellectual property law governs copyrights, but property 
law governs ownership rights in the underlying material “copy” or 
object itself.23  
The ownership of a copyright to the content of a given text 
message hinges on the length of the text message.24 If a text 
message is short, as most text messages tend to be, the author does 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. at 834 (“[T]he Court implicitly creates a distinction between 
simple objects and smart objects (with data inside), with the latter being granted 
additional protection.”). 
 19. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and 
Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1253–60 (2015) (explaining that 
the majority of courts classify software transactions as licenses instead of sales). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 21. See id. (distinguishing ownership of a copyright from ownership of an 
object). 
 22. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 19, at 1216 (“The exhaustion 
principle, though historically associated with a clear distinction between copy and 
copyright, is in fact the primary tool in copyright law for mediating the somewhat 
indistinct line separating the copy and the work.”). 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (distinguishing ownership of a copyright from 
ownership of an object). 
 24. See Edina Harbinja, Legal Nature of Emails: A Comparative Perspective, 
14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 227, 235–36 (2016) (“To conclude, despite long emails 
meeting the requirement of originality and fixation, there would be a regulatory 
vacuum for a significant number of short emails.”). 
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not hold the copyright to the content of that message.25 However, 
the author likely has copyright protection over the content of the 
text message if the text message is lengthy and more complex, an 
“original work of authorship,” and is “electronically fixated.”26 
Even though copyright law might protect some text messages, 
copyright law alone is not adequate to protect all text messages, 
and does not protect the text message recipient.27 Thus, because 
copyright law does not effectively protect text message authors and 
recipients, property law should fill the needed gap and give text 
message owners the rights against intrusive cellular service 
providers to which they are entitled.  
B. Are Text Messages Distinguishable from E-Mails? 
The distinction between text messages and e-mails is subtle, 
but there are some fundamental differences between the two.28 In 
particular, text messages are distinguishable from e-mails both in 
how society uses text messages to communicate and in how text 
messages mechanically operate.29 
While both the judiciary and the legal academy have 
addressed the status of e-mails as “property,” the same question 
regarding text messages has gone unanswered.30 Most 
                                                                                                     
 25. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, MULTIPLE WORKS 2 (2019), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf. 
 26. See Harbinja, supra note 24, at 235 (explaining that longer e-mails meet 
the originality and fixation copyright requirements). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Joseph C. Vitale, Note, Text Me, Maybe?: State v. Hinton and the 
Possibility of Fourth Amendment Protections Over Sent Text Messages Stored in 
Another’s Cell Phone, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1109, 1141 (2014) (arguing that text 
messages differ from e-mails because of the different ways society utilizes the 
technologies). 
 29. See id. at 1140–41 (distinguishing text messages from e-mails); 
Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o OMG They Searched My Txts: Unraveling the 
Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 685, 686 (“[T]ext 
messages, unlike letters or e-mails, have in the past only been generally 
accessible through a mobile device.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 
16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288, at *11 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) 
(determining that e-mails constitute intangible personal property); infra note 31 
(collecting legal scholarship that addresses the question of whether e-mail is 
property). 
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commentators who have addressed the issue with regard to e-mails 
advocate for the treatment of e-mails as property.31  
Courts routinely consider whether e-mails constitute 
descendible intangible personal property in the probate context 
(and often find that they are property in probate cases), but courts 
do not consider whether text messages constitute property with the 
same regularity.32 And the recent surge of federal district courts 
concluding that e-mails constitute intangible property indicates 
that the first “text messages are property” case could be right 
around the corner.33 The ever-increasing popularity of text 
messages likely signals that courts will have to tackle the issue of 
whether text messages constitute property in the coming years.34 
What someone might have sent via e-mail ten years ago is sent via 
text message today, and thus issues regarding text message 
ownership will become more and more common.35 
                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., Jennifer Arner, Comment, Looking Forward by Looking 
Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights 
Protections in E-mail, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 349, 379 (Summer 2014) (“[I]f 
the Court is willing to recognize true property rights in particular forms of 
electronic communication, the property-centered approach relied on in Jones will 
afford bright-line protections for these intangible interests.”); Justin Atwater, 
Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your 
Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397, 418 (“Although e-mail shares 
qualities with both tangible and intangible property, the differences create 
enough of a distinction that the laws of property cannot effectively deal with who 
owns e-mail.”); Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s 
Emails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 281, 319 (2007) (“The ownership and intellectual property interests 
authors have in their electronically stored e-mail accounts are no less legitimate 
than are such interests in messages created with paper and pen.”). But see 
Harbinja, supra note 24, at 254 (“Based upon current copyright and property law, 
and upon the western theories of property, the legal nature of email appears clear. 
Email content is not the property of its users.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Atwater, supra note 31, at 400–02 (discussing how a probate 
court forced Yahoo! to hand over a deceased marine’s e-mails to his parents). 
 33. Infra notes 118–126 and accompanying text. 
 34. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining 
how text messaging has become “the most widely used mobile data service”). 
 35. See Lydia Dishman, Texting Is The New Email—Does Your Company Do 
It Right?, FAST COMPANY (May 30, 2013), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3010237/texting-is-the-new-email-does-your-
company-do-it-right (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (“[T]exting—to the tune of 9.8 
trillion sent in 2012—is becoming the new medium through which companies 
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III. The History of Intangible Property Law and Cybertrespass 
Intangible personal property, as its name suggests, is a 
personal property or a “chattel” that cannot be physically 
touched.36 Text messages are a form of “digital” property, which is 
arguably a type of intangible personal property.37 Courts are split 
on whether disrupting possession of someone’s intangible property 
is equivalent to disrupting possession of physical property, or, 
instead, breaching a contractually created right.38 If a court treats 
a dispute over theft of intangible property as a dispute over 
personal property, the aggrieved party can pursue a conversion or 
trespass to chattels tort claim for the disruption of their intangible 
property rights.39 However, if a court treats the same dispute as a 
potential breach of a contractually created right, the aggrieved 
party cannot bring a tort law cause of action and is limited to 
contractual remedies.40  
The principal cases involving disputes over the property status 
of intangible personal property concerned perhaps the earliest 
widely available digital asset: internet domain names.41 These 
cases determined whether a domain name was a type of property, 
and if it was, whether the aggrieved party could pursue a 
traditional property-based claim against the domain name 
                                                                                                     
communicate.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Intangible Personal Property, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/intangible-personal-property.asp (last 
updated Feb. 12, 2018) (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“Intangible personal property 
is something of individual value that cannot be touched or held.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that the taking of an intangible property provided the basis for a property law 
conversion claim). But see Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 
85–88 (Va. 2000) (finding that the taking of an intangible property disrupted a 
contractual, and not a property, right). 
 39. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029–36 (determining that the defendant’s 
giving away of the plaintiff’s intangible property without his consent “supported 
a claim for conversion”). 
 40. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 85–88 (explaining that a domain name, 
although an intangible property, is the product of a service contract that does not 
exist separate from the service that created it and is therefore a contractually 
created right). 
 41. Infra Part III.A–B.  
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registrar.42 To be sure, text messages are not domain names, but 
both text messages and domain names arguably constitute forms 
of intangible personal property.43 Accordingly, the courts’ 
reasoning in the domain name cases applies to situations involving 
other intangible personal properties, such as text messages.44 
This Part, in subparts A and B, proceeds by analyzing the two 
leading cases for and against the theory that digital property 
constitutes intangible personal property. Then, subpart C 
contrasts these two cases and explores what drove the courts to 
come out on opposite sides of the issue. Finally, subpart D tracks 
the evolution of property law tort remedies as applied to digital 
property and examines recent federal court cases determining that 
e-mails constitute property. 
A. The Intangible Personal Property Theory: Digital Assets Can 
Be Owned 
Enter Kremen v. Cohen.45 Kremen involved a California 
plaintiff, Gary Kremen, who sought conversion damages from a 
defendant who stole Kremen’s internet domain name.46 Kremen 
bought the domain name “sex.com” through a domain name 
registrar.47 Shortly thereafter, a con man named Stephen Cohen 
duped the domain name registrar into transferring possession of 
Kremen’s sex.com domain name to Cohen’s account.48 Kremen 
then sued Cohen and the domain name registrar, claiming that the 
tort of conversion applied to Cohen’s stealing Kremen’s sex.com 
domain name.49 
                                                                                                     
 42. Infra Part III.A–B. 
 43. Infra Part V.A. 
 44. Infra Part V.A. 
 45. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 46. See id. at 1026 (“We decide whether Network Solutions may be liable for 
giving away a registrant’s domain name on the basis of a forged letter.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1027. 
 49. See id. at 1028 (“His third theory is that he has a property right in the 
domain name sex.com, and Network Solutions committed the tort of conversion 
by giving it away to Cohen.”). 
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Before Kremen could prove the tort of conversion, he first had 
to prove that the domain name Cohen took constituted a piece of 
property.50 The Ninth Circuit defines property as a “broad concept 
that includes every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible 
of possession or disposition.”51 Under the court’s three-part test, a 
digital asset constitutes personal property if: (1) there is “an 
interest capable of precise definition”; (2) it is “capable of exclusive 
possession or control”; and (3) there is a “legitimate claim to 
exclusivity.”52  
The Ninth Circuit found that domain names satisfied each 
criterion required under the three-part property test.53 First, the 
court explained that domain names are capable of precise 
definition because the person who registers the domain name 
chooses exactly where on the internet those who type that 
particular domain name are sent.54 Second, the court noted that 
domain names are capable of exclusive possession or control 
because the registrant alone decides on what the domain name will 
be.55 Finally, the court reasoned that there is a legitimate claim to 
exclusivity with regard to domain names, because registering a 
domain name is a way of communicating sole ownership of the 
internet domain to others, ensuring registrants gain a benefit on 
their time and money spent developing their websites, and 
encouraging investment in domain names and the internet 
overall.56 
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. 1029–30 (explaining that Kremen must first establish that he had 
a property right in the domain name before he can make a conversion tort claim). 
 51. Id. at 1030. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (finding that “Kremen therefore had an intangible property right 
in his domain name”). 
 54. See id. (“Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of land, a domain name 
is a well-defined interest.”). 
 55. See id. (“Ownership is exclusive in that the registrant alone makes that 
decision.”). 
 56. See id. at 1030 
Registrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering a 
domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. 
It informs others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one 
else’s. Many registrants also invest substantial time and money to 
develop and promote websites that depend on their domain names. 
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After determining that Kremen owned property rights to his 
domain name, the court analyzed whether the tort of conversion 
applied to disputes regarding intangible property.57 Historically, 
intangible property conversion claims required that a document 
exist where the intangible rights are merged into the physical 
document.58 This means that there is a physical document that 
represents and is equivalent to the intangible obligation (e.g., a 
stock certificate representing ownership of a share of stock).59 
However, the court explained that courts in California had rejected 
the strict merger requirement. But, even if the merger 
requirement applied, it was minimal and required only some 
relationship with a tangible object.60 The court reasoned that 
Kremen’s sex.com domain name digital file must be stored within 
a physical computer associated with the domain name provider 
somewhere, and found that this connection was sufficient to satisfy 
conversion’s merger requirement.61 
This finding, coupled with the court’s determination that 
Kremen had a property right in his domain name, led the court to 
conclude that Kremen brought a viable conversion claim.62 In 
closing, the court justified its conclusion by noting that “the 
                                                                                                     
 57. See id. at 1029 (“To establish that tort, a plaintiff must show ‘ownership 
or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and 
damages.’” (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 
958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
 58. See id. at 1031  
An intangible is “merged” in a document when, “by the appropriate rule 
of law, the right to the immediate possession of a chattel and the power 
to acquire such possession is represented by [the] document,” or when 
“an intangible obligation [is] represented by [the] document, which is 
regarded as equivalent to the obligation.” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 1033 (“Assuming arguendo that California retains some 
vestigial merger requirement, it is clearly minimal, and at most requires only 
some connection to a document or tangible object—not representation of the 
owner’s intangible interest in the strict Restatement sense.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 61. See id. at 1033–34 (“We agree that the [domain name database] is a 
document (or perhaps more accurately a collection of documents). . . . That it is 
stored in electronic form rather than on ink and paper is immaterial.”). 
 62. See id. at 1036 (“The evidence supported a claim for conversion.”). 
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common law does not stand idle while the people give away the 
property of others.”63 
B. The Contractually Created Right Theory: Digital Assets Cannot 
Be Owned 
Just as Kremen stands for the proposition that domain names 
are property, Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, 
Inc.64 represents the legal theory that domain names are not 
property.65 In Umbro, plaintiff Umbro International, Inc. (Umbro) 
sought to garnish thirty-eight domain names held by defendant 
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI).66 Umbro previously obtained a 
judgment against a debtor in an unrelated bankruptcy action, and 
thereafter instituted this garnishment proceeding against NSI to 
collect on the debtor’s domain names held by NSI.67 Umbro sought 
a court order requiring NSI to begin the process of preparing the 
domain names for a sheriff’s sale.68 NSI responded to Umbro’s 
lawsuit by claiming that it did not own any of the debtor’s 
property.69 NSI argued that the domain names were contractually 
created rights, which arose from NSI’s contractual relationship 
with the debtor; thus, the domain names were not property capable 
of garnishment.70 
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with NSI and 
determined that the intangible domain names were created solely 
because of a contractual relationship, and, thus, incapable of 
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. 
 64. 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). 
 65. See Milton L. Mueller & Farzaneh Badiei, Governing Internet Territory: 
ICANN, Sovereignty Claims, Property Rights and Country Code Top-Level 
Domains, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 435, 475 (2017) (explaining that Umbro 
has become one of the “most commonly cited” cases to prove that domain names 
are service contracts). 
 66. See Network Sols. Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000) 
(“In this case of first impression, we address the issue whether a contractual right 
to use an Internet domain name can be garnished.”). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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garnishment.71 Because the debtor’s rights to the domain names 
did not exist “separate and apart from” NSI’s services to the debtor, 
the court deemed the domain names the but-for product of a 
contract.72 Although the court agreed that the registrant gained 
the right to use the domain names upon registration, the right to 
use the domain names was “inextricably linked” to NSI’s services.73 
Therefore, because garnishment proceedings are limited to 
liabilities owed, and service contracts are not within the statutory 
definition of the term “liabilities,” the court reasoned that Umbro 
could not garnish NSI’s domain names.74  
Umbro stands for the proposition that domain names, and 
intangible property generally, are the product of a contract 
between the digital asset user and the digital asset provider.75 
Remarkably, NSI itself acknowledged and conceded that domain 
names constitute an intangible property during oral argument.76 
Although the court briefly analyzed the “contractually created 
right” versus “intangible property” argument, it dismissed NSI’s 
oral argument concession and explained that classifying domain 
names as a type of property was not dispositive of the case.77 The 
                                                                                                     
 71. See id. at 86 (“A contract for services is not ‘a liability’ as that term is 
used in § 8.01–511 and hence is not subject to garnishment.”). 
 72. See id. (“[W]hatever contractual rights the judgment debtor has in the 
domain names at issue in this appeal, those rights do not exist separate and apart 
from NSI’s services. Therefore . . . a domain name registration is the product of a 
contract for services between the registrar and registrant.”). 
 73. See id. (“[W]e agree with Umbro that a domain name registrant acquires 
the contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of time. 
However, that contractual right is inextricably bound to the domain name 
services that NSI provides.”). 
 74. See id. (“[A] contract for services is not ‘a liability’ as that term is used in 
§ 8.01–511 and hence is not subject to garnishment.”). 
 75. See Mueller & Badiei, supra note 65, at 475 (explaining why Umbro has 
become “one of the cases most commonly cited to prove that domain names are 
services”). 
 76. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 (“[W]e must point out that NSI 
acknowledged during oral argument before this Court that the right to use a 
domain name is a form of intangible personal property.”). 
 77. See id. at 770 (“However, NSI’s acknowledgement is not dispositive of 
this appeal. Likewise, we do not believe that it is essential to the outcome of this 
case to decide whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as 
a ‘form of intellectual property.’”). 
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court made clear that it did not garnish NSI’s domain names 
because it feared that doing so would make practically any service 
contract garnishable.78 
The Umbro case garnered a significant amount of criticism not 
for its holding, but for what the court failed to address.79 Although 
Kremen plainly stands for the proposition that property rights 
exist in domain names,80 Umbro’s substantive holding is not that 
domain names are contractually created rights.81 The only legal 
conclusion Umbro drew is that domain names do not fall within 
the definition of “liability” as an element of the Virginia 
garnishment statute.82 The court in Umbro briefly discussed only 
the property status of domain names in dicta when noting that NSI 
conceded that domain names were intangible property at oral 
argument.83 Even though Umbro casually observed that a domain 
name represented a contractual right, the court never explicitly 
stated that domain names are not intangible property.84 The court 
in Umbro even attempted to back away from making any definitive 
statements regarding domain name property rights (or lack 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. at 771 (“If we allow the garnishment of NSI’s services in this case 
because those services create a contractual right to use a domain name, we believe 
that practically any service would be garnishable.”). 
 79. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: 
Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 97, 108 (2003) (calling 
Umbro a “red herring” case because it did not expressly hold that a domain name 
is not property). 
 80. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kremen 
therefore had an intangible property right in his domain name . . . .”). 
 81. See Daniel Hancock, Note, You Can Have It, But Can You Hold It?: 
Treating Domain Names as Tangible Property, 99 KY. L.J. 185, 192–93 (2011) 
(“Umbro is often cited for the proposition that a domain name is simply a 
contractual arrangement and therefore cannot be a property right. This assertion 
is a misreading of the case.”). 
 82. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 108 (“The court simply said that a 
domain name did not constitute a ‘liability’ for the purpose of the Virginia 
garnishment statute.”). 
 83. See Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) 
(“Initially, we must point out that NSI acknowledged during oral argument before 
this Court that the right to use a domain name is a form of intangible personal 
property.”). 
 84. See id. at 770 (“[W]e agree with Umbro that a domain name registrant 
acquires the contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period 
of time.”). 
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thereof), noting that whether or not domain names constitute 
intangible property was not essential to the outcome of the case.85  
C. Comparing the Intangible Property Theory to the Contractually 
Created Right Theory 
Kremen and Umbro represent the two prevailing views on 
digital property’s status as either intangible property or a contract 
for services.86 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Kremen case 
stands for the theory that a digital asset is an intangible property 
owned by the user.87 And although the Supreme Court of Virginia 
in Umbro never explicitly said so, the Umbro case stands for the 
theory that a digital asset is the product of a contract entered into 
between a user and a digital asset provider.88  
Kremen and Umbro’s different outcomes are better understood 
when comparing the two distinguishing factors that led to their 
contrasting outcomes: (1) the unique parties to each case and 
(2) the different laws applied in each case. Kremen involved 
sympathetic plaintiff Gary Kremen, a “geek-turned-entrepreneur” 
who thought he hit the jackpot when he became the “proud owner” 
of sex.com (implying from the outset that domain names could be 
owned as property).89 Kremen, unable to collect any of his initial 
$65 million judgment against domain thief Stephen Cohen (on 
account of Cohen fleeing the country), sued the deep-pocketed 
domain name provider responsible for carelessly transferring his 
domain to Cohen.90  
                                                                                                     
 85. See id. (“[W]e do not believe that it is essential to the outcome of this case 
to decide whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as a 
form of ‘intellectual property.’”). 
 86. See Mueller & Badiei, supra note 65, at 472–73 (describing the property 
status of domain names as “less than settled” after twenty years of debate).  
 87. See Hancock, supra note 81, at 194–95 (calling the Kremen case 
illustrative of the view the domain names are intangible property).  
 88. See id. at 191–92 (explaining that Umbro represents the view that 
domain names are primarily contractual rights).  
 89. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1026–28 (describing Gary Kremen as computer 
geek who beat the hordes of NASDAQ day traders to become “the proud owner of 
sex.com”). 
 90. See id. at 1035 (“Kremen never did anything. It would not be unfair to 
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Umbro involved unsympathetic plaintiff Umbro International, 
a multinational sporting equipment manufacturer, who tried to 
gain control of umbro.com from a “classic domain name pirate”91 
who held the “contractual right to use” the domain name (implying 
from the outset that the domain names were the but-for product of 
a contractual relationship).92 Umbro International, which had 
already received the prized umbro.com domain as part of the 
original default judgment against the cybersquatter, pursued 
garnishment of the domain names solely to pay off its attorney’s 
fees.93  
Kremen had his domain name involuntarily transferred from 
him, needed the money, and had run out of legal options.94 
Conversely, Umbro International, a successful corporation, sought 
possession of a domain name it never previously owned or lost, and 
could likely absorb the relatively small amount of attorney’s fees it 
sought to garnish.95 It is therefore unsurprising that the Kremen 
court awarded down-on-his-luck Gary Kremen recourse against 
the culpable defendant,96 while the Umbro court declined to award 
Umbro International the domain names to pay off its attorney’s 
fees.97  
                                                                                                     
hold Network Solutions responsible and force it to try to recoup its losses by 
chasing down Cohen. This, at any rate, is the logic of the common law, and we do 
not lightly discard it.”). 
 91. See Umbro Int’l, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 140 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 1999) (describing the judgment debtor who owned umbro.com as a “classic 
domain name pirate”). 
 92. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81 (“[W]e address the issue whether a 
contractual right to use an Internet domain name can be garnished.”). 
 93. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 105 (“Like many judgment debtors, 
Canada, Inc. did not write a check to Umbro, so like many judgment creditors, 
Umbro was forced to find property against which to enforce its judgment.”). 
 94. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kremen 
never did anything. It would not be unfair to hold Network Solutions responsible 
and force it to try to recoup its losses by chasing down Cohen. This, at any rate, 
is the logic of the common law, and we do not lightly discard it.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 95. See Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000) 
(describing Umbro International’s default judgment regarding umbro.com 
against 3263851 Canada).  
 96. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036 (“The evidence supported a claim for 
conversion, and the district court should not have rejected it.”). 
 97. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 88 (“Even though the Internet is a ‘new avenue 
of commerce,’ we cannot extend established legal principles beyond their 
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A second important distinction between Kremen and Umbro 
lies in the different legal doctrines at play within each case. Gary 
Kremen’s conversion claim was based on the common law tort, a 
necessary element of which was the court’s determination that 
domain names constitute intangible property.98 The flexible 
common law basis of Kremen’s conversion claim gave the court 
leeway to determine an equitable outcome.99  
In contrast, Umbro International’s garnishment claim was 
based on a Virginia statute that did not require the court to 
determine whether domain names constitute intangible personal 
property.100 Umbro’s rigid statutory basis constrained the court to 
solely determining whether a domain name was within the 
definition of a “liability” under the Virginia garnishment law.101 In 
short, the Kremen court had to declare that domain names 
                                                                                                     
statutory parameters. .  .  . For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, dismiss the garnishment summons, and enter final judgment in 
favor of NSI.” (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. 
Ill. 1996))). 
 98. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (explaining that the California common 
law tort of conversion required the plaintiff to show ownership or a right to 
possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property, and damages). 
 99. See id. at 1036 (explaining that the court will “apply the common law 
until the legislature tells us otherwise. And the common law does not stand idle 
while people give away the property of others”). 
 100. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 85 (describing garnishment in Virginia as “a 
creature of statute unknown to the common law, and hence the provisions of the 
statute must be strictly satisfied”). 
 101. See Moringiello, supra note 79, at 105 (“Garnishment, an action that did 
not exist at common law, is a creature solely of statute. . . . The Virginia 
garnishment statute is specific as to what types of property it covers and under 
the statute, only a ‘liability’ to the judgment debtor can be garnished.”). 
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constitute intangible property to reach an equitable outcome,102 
while the Umbro court did not.103  
D. The Evolution of Cybertrespass 
Fifteen years after Kremen and Umbro, the question of 
whether intangible property can be converted or trespassed upon 
remains far from settled.104 However, Kremen’s intangible property 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1036  
The district court thought there were “methods better suited to 
regulate the vagaries of domain names” and left it “to the legislature 
to fashion an appropriate statutory scheme.” The legislature, of course, 
is always free (within constitutional bounds) to refashion the system 
that courts come up with. But that doesn’t mean we should throw up 
our hands and let private relations degenerate into a free-for-all in the 
meantime. We apply the common law until the legislature tells us 
otherwise. And the common law does not stand idle while people give 
away the property of others. 
(internal citation omitted). 
 103. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 88 (“Even though the Internet is a ‘new avenue 
of commerce,’ we cannot extend established legal principles beyond their 
statutory parameters. . . . For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, dismiss the garnishment summons, and enter final judgment in 
favor of NSI.” (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. 
Ill. 1996))). 
 104. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030–35 (explaining what constitutes an 
intangible personal property and determining that an intangible personal 
property can be the basis for a conversion claim); Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 
460 F.3d 400, 405 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that although it “is unclear and 
unresolved” whether electronic data constitutes intangible property, the Kremen 
theory is one possible solution to the issue at hand); Emke v. Compana, L.L.C., 
No. 3:06-CV-1416-L, 2007 WL 2781661, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007) 
(explaining that a claim of conversion of a domain name depends on what state 
law is applied); Dethmers Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg., 23 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 1006–07 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (surveying state caselaw to decide that Nebraska 
law might allow a claim for conversion of an unpatented idea); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. 
Plasti-Clip Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1212, 1233–34 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that the 
plaintiff could make a claim for conversion of an idea). But see Kaempe v. Myers, 
367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e conclude that it remains unclear 
whether D.C. law would permit an action for conversion of patent rights. The D.C. 
courts have never ruled on whether, or under what circumstances, intangible 
property of this nature can be the subject of a suit for conversion.”); In re TJX Co. 
Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D. Mass. 2007) (determining 
that Massachusetts law does not support a claim for conversion of intangible 
account data); Famology.com Inc. v. Perot Sys. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591 
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that because domain names are not tangible personal 
property, the plaintiff could not bring a conversion action under Pennsylvania 
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theory is spreading beyond domain name cases, as courts have 
recognized websites,105 trademarks,106 licenses,107 investor lists,108 
and even expressed ideas109 as forms of intangible property. 
Because the internet’s various equipment and virtual facilities 
are “not by any stretch of the imagination real property,” the 
technological revolution forced courts and legal scholars to 
reevaluate the property laws governing the various digital devices 
that make up the internet.110 The digital devices that constitute 
the internet are a “new” form of chattel, so it is logical that the law 
of trespass to chattels and conversion evolved to govern these 
devices.111 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the classic 
language of an actionable trespass to chattels claim: 
                                                                                                     
law). 
 105. See Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Tech., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 
2009) (explaining that a website is personal property because it “has a physical 
presence on computer drive, causes tangible effects on computers, and can be 
perceived by the senses”). 
 106. See English & Sons, Inc. v. Straw Hat Rest., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 904, 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
Trademarks, service marks, trade names, and much of the other 
intellectual property at issue here, meet this test. These can be 
precisely defined, exclusively possessed and controlled, and they can 
be the subject of a legitimate claim to such exclusivity. Under Kremen, 
then, such intellectual property should normally be proper objects of 
conversion. 
 107. See M.C. Multi-Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assoc., Ltd., 193 P.3d 
536, 543 (Nev. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that a contractor’s license is intangible 
personal property that may be converted under Nevada law.”). 
 108. See Shmueli v. Corcoran Grp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (N.Y. Sup. 2005) 
(“The court, therefore, finds that plaintiff’s computerized client/investor list is 
convertible property.”). 
 109. See Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Although an idea alone cannot be converted, the ‘tangible 
expression or implementation of that idea’ can be.” (quoting Matzan v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 134 A.D.2d 863, 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987))). 
 110. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003) 
(explaining how the rise of the internet has caused a “rethinking of the property 
relations governed by the common law of trespass”). 
 111. See id. (“[T]he focus of emphasis shifts because the various equipment 
and facilities that make up the internet are not by any stretch of the imagination 
real property. Rather, they are a new form of chattel, which are presumptively 
governed by the law of trespass to chattels.”). 
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One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to 
the possessor of the chattel if, but only if, 
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or 
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, 
or 
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a 
substantial time, or 
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to 
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally 
protected interest.112 
The earliest virtual trespass to chattels (cybertrespass) cases 
involved unauthorized intrusions via the internet upon computer 
equipment.113 These intrusions were serious enough to either 
overload the plaintiffs’ computers and cause them to crash or 
crowd their hard drives’ limited space with e-mails and burden the 
system owner with the task of deleting them.114 More recently, 
virtual trespass to chattels cases have involved plaintiffs bringing 
claims based on trespass to intangible personal properties, such as 
social media accounts115 and e-mails.116  
                                                                                                     
 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
 113. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063, 
1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting eBay a preliminary injunction against Bidder’s 
Edge web spiders based on a trespass to chattels claim even though Bidder’s Edge 
software occupied, at most, between 1.11% and 1.53% of eBay’s servers); Am. 
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding the 
defendant liable for trespass to chattels for sending unauthorized bulk e-mails); 
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027–28 (S.D. 
Ohio 1997) (granting the plaintiff a preliminary injunction to stop defendant’s 
spam e-mails under a trespass to chattels theory). But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 
71 P.3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003) (denying Intel’s trespass to chattel claim because 
Hamidi’s mass e-mails did not physically damage Intel’s servers). 
 114. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028 (“High volumes of junk e-mail 
devour computer processing and storage capacity, slow down data transfer 
between computers over the Internet by congesting the electronic paths through 
which the messages travel, and cause recipients to spend time and money wading 
through messages that they do not want.”). 
 115. See Salonclick LLC v. SuperEgo Mgmt. LLC, 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 
WL 239379, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (establishing that social media 
accounts are intangible personal property capable of being the subject of a 
conversion action, but dismissing the plaintiff’s trespass to chattels action 
because the social media account itself did not suffer injury as a result of 
defendant’s trespass). 
 116. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 
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Although text messages are a different form of digital 
communication from e-mails,117 two recent opinions determining 
that e-mails constitute intangible personal property could outline 
the legal framework courts will apply to disputes over text 
messages in future cases.118 In Porters Building Centers, Inc. v. 
Sprint Lumber,119 a Missouri federal district court determined that 
if an intangible property has a connection to tangible property, the 
intangible property is a chattel capable of being the subject of a 
trespass to chattels action.120 The court then explained that 
e-mails are a “chattel” because e-mail communications are 
connected to tangible servers stored in physical data centers.121 
After determining that e-mails constitute a “chattel,” the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had a valid trespass to chattels claim 
against the defendant for improperly accessing and reading his 
personal e-mails.122  
As well, in Skapinetz v. CoesterVMS.com Inc.,123 a Maryland 
federal district court determined that e-mails, while not a 
traditional form of property, constitute “digital” property 
nonetheless.124 This case again concerned a client’s improper 
                                                                                                     
2017 WL 4413288, at *15 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (establishing that e-mails are 
intangible personal property, and thus a chattel, because the e-mail 
communication is connected to a tangible server, and thus allowing plaintiff’s 
trespass to chattels claim to survive summary judgment). 
 117. Supra Part II.B. 
 118. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., 2017 WL 4413288, at *11 (finding that e-mails 
constitute intangible personal property because personal property can be 
intangible if there is a connection to tangible property, and the e-mail 
“communications are connected to something tangible—i.e., Google’s servers”). 
 119. No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017). 
 120. See id. at *11 (“The Court concludes Missouri courts would find a 
trespass to chattel claim includes an email communication when the email 
communication is connected to a tangible object, such as a server.”). 
 121. See id. (“The Court takes judicial notice that Google stores its customers’ 
email communications on servers. . . . Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] email 
communications are connected to something tangible—i.e., Google’s servers.”). 
 122. See id. (concluding that because a “chattel” extends to intangible 
property when the intangible property is connected to a tangible object, the 
plaintiff could maintain his trespass to chattels action against the defendant). 
 123. No. PX-17-1098, 2018 WL 805393 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2018). 
 124. See id. at *4 (“Although email accounts and electronic communications 
are not tangible property in the traditional sense, many courts have recognized 
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access to a former employer’s personal Gmail account.125 After 
finding that e-mails constitute digital property, the court 
proceeded to determine that Georgia law allowed for both trespass 
to chattels claims and conversion claims involving intangible 
personal property such as e-mails.126 By extension, the courts’ 
reasoning in Porters Building Centers and Skapinetz could just as 
easily have applied to a case involving improper access to an 
iMessage account. 
In sum, intangible property law has evolved beyond Kremen’s 
domain names to encompass a diverse group of digital assets. 
Courts are increasingly receptive to plaintiffs bringing 
property-based claims when their digital assets are trespassed 
upon or stolen. But, when plaintiffs do not bring these 
property-based causes of action, the judiciary defaults to Umbro’s 
“contractually created right” theory when dealing with digital 
assets,127 as Part IV will show.128 
IV. The Law Does Not Protect Text Messages 
A. The Judiciary Does Not Protect Text Messages: The iMessage 
Litigation 
The cases discussed below, centering around the Apple text 
messaging application “iMessage,” merit thorough analysis 
because they are the only instances in which the judiciary has 
analyzed disputes regarding iMessage delivery problems.129 The 
cases do not analyze the disputes over missing and delayed text 
                                                                                                     
claims for conversion or trespass to chattels involving digital ‘property.’”). 
 125. See id. (“Skapinetz pleads that Defendants committed the torts of 
trespass and conversion by accessing without authorization, and intermeddling 
with, Skapinetz’s email accounts and electronic communications.”). 
 126. See id. (“These facts, taken as true, plausibly establish that Defendants 
assumed and exercised the right of ownership over Skapinetz’s email accounts, 
albeit briefly, and these actions were inconsistent with Skapinetz’s property 
rights. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the common law claim for 
conversion (Count Four) is DENIED.”). 
 127. Supra Part III.B. 
 128. Infra Part IV.A. 
 129. Infra Part IV.A. 
1096 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073 (2019) 
 
messages as if they were property trespassed upon or stolen.130 
Instead, the cases treat the disputes over text message delivery as 
a contractual dispute, harkening back to Umbro’s analysis of the 
specific terms of the contractual agreement.131 
The iMessage litigation attracted a fair amount of publicity132 
because many former iPhone users experienced, and continue to 
experience,133 similar iMessage disruptions after switching to a 
non-Apple device.134 iMessage, Apple’s proprietary text messaging 
service, is available only on Apple devices, and Apple works hard 
to keep it that way.135 This strategy seems to work for Apple, as 
iPhone users often cite iMessage as the sole reason they refrain 
                                                                                                     
 130. Infra Part IV.A. 
 131. Infra Part IV.A. 
 132. See Christina Bonnington, Apple Hit with Federal Lawsuit Over 
iMessage Delivery Issues, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:55 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/apple-lawsuit-imessages/ (last visited Mar. 19, 
2019) (detailing the lawsuit a former iPhone user brought against Apple for 
interfering with the delivery of iMessage text messages after the former iPhone 
user switched to an Android phone) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 133. See, e.g., Terry Storch (@TerryStorch), TWITTER (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://twitter.com/TerryStorch/status/805540549361070080 (last visited Mar. 
19, 2019) (“The transition from iPhone to Android is still rough because of 
iMessage. As hard as you try, messages still get lost in the Interwebs.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lucocis, After Almost 18 Months of 
Being on Android, I Still Have Problems Because of iMessages, REDDIT (May 26, 
2016), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Android/comments/40np11/after_almost_18_months_of
_being_on_android_i/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (describing a former iPhone 
user’s struggle with losing text messages after switching to an Android device) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 134. See Damon Beres, Apple Trapped Me on iOS—Perhaps Forever, 
MASHABLE (Oct. 4, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/10/04/the-iphone-owns-my-
soul/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“If you switch to Android from iOS, I can nearly 
guarantee that you will miss texts from people you care about, and you may not 
be able to figure out how to fix it, exactly.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 135. See Chance Miller, This App Claims to Bring iMessage Support to 
Android, But Don’t Expect It To Last, 9TO5MAC (Dec. 12, 2017, 3:39 PM), 
https://9to5mac.com/2017/12/12/imessage-support-on-android-app/ (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2019) (“As has been the case with previous services that claim to add 
iMessages support to Android, you shouldn’t expect this one to last for long. Apple 
generally does a good job of cracking down on these sorts of applications.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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from switching to a non-Apple cellular device.136 Even if Apple’s 
self-contained technological ecosystem works fine for those who 
stick to Apple products, those who manage to escape Apple’s 
“walled garden” soon find that making the switch is more painful 
than expected.137 
1. Does Withholding Text Messages Amount to Tortious 
Interference with Contract? 
Moore v. Apple, Inc.138 involved a plaintiff who claimed she 
failed to receive iMessage text messages after she switched from 
an Apple iPhone to an Android device.139 Adrienne Moore, who 
switched from an iPhone to a Samsung device running Android 
operating software, sued Apple because she failed to receive 
“countless text messages sent to her from Apple device users.”140 
                                                                                                     
 136. See, e.g., Patrick Holland, iPhone’s Blue Bubble Won’t Let Me Stray to the 
Galaxy S8, CNET (Apr. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-the-
iphones-blue-bubble-keeps-me-from-going-android/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) 
(“So if iMessage doesn’t hop ship to Android, then I probably won’t either.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Damon Beres, iMessage Is the 
Only Thing Keeping Me on an iPhone, MASHABLE (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://mashable.com/2017/02/10/imessage-is-keeping-me-on-
iphone/#lKJYsF9EEmq8 (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“Apple has trapped me. 
iMessage, for the foreseeable future, will be the reason I stay on an iPhone, the 
reason I update my iOS software and ultimately the reason I buy a new iPhone 
when upgrade time rolls around.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Lauren Goode, iMessage is the Glue that Keeps Me Stuck to the iPhone, 
VERGE (Oct. 10, 2016, 9:36 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/10/13225514/apple-iphone-cant-switch-pixel-
android-imessage-addiction (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (“Of course Apple wasn’t 
going to allow iMessage to function on Android: iMessage is the glue that keeps 
people stuck to their iPhones and Macs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 137. See Victor Luckerson, Apple Acknowledges iMessage Problems, TIME 
(May 22, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/tech/mobile/aple-
imessage-problems-fix/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“But some people 
who switch from an iPhone to a non-Apple device have found it difficult to 
dissociate their phone numbers from iMessage. That leads to text messages from 
friends getting sucked up into Apple’s database and disappearing.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 138. 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 139. See id. at 1195 (“Plaintiff replaced her iPhone 4 with a Samsung Galaxy 
S5. As a result of that switch, Plaintiff alleges that she has failed to received 
countless text messages sent to her from Apple device users.”). 
 140. See id. (describing plaintiff Adrienne Moore’s factual allegations 
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Moore reached out to Verizon, her cellular service provider, and 
Apple, and although both acknowledged that she was experiencing 
a known issue, their proposals to troubleshoot the problem were 
ultimately unsuccessful.141 The California federal district court 
noted that “[Moore was] not the only former Apple device user to 
encounter the problem of undelivered text messages.”142 Despite 
her repeated attempts to rectify the situation and receive text 
messages from iPhone users, Moore continued to miss text 
messages.143 Further, Moore stated that had she known about the 
undelivered text message problem at the outset, she would not 
have used iMessage or purchased an iPhone in the first place.144  
Moore claimed that Apple’s failure to deliver iMessages to her 
Android device (1) tortiously interfered with her Verizon contract 
and (2) violated California’s Unfair Competition Law145 (UCL) and 
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act146 (CLRA).147 Although 
the court dismissed Moore’s statutory UCL and CLRA claims, her 
tortious interference with contract claim survived the motion to 
dismiss.148  
Moore claimed that (1) there was a valid contract between her 
and Verizon Wireless; (2) Apple had knowledge of this contract; 
(3) Apple intentionally acted to induce a breach or disruption of her 
contractual relationship with Verizon; (4) there was an actual 
breach or disruption of her contract; and (5) that there was 
                                                                                                     
regarding her failure to receive text messages after switching from an iPhone to 
an Android device).  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 
Reg. Sess.). 
 147. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1195 (outlining Moore’s causes of action).  
 148. See id. at 1205 (“[I]n summary, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s unlawful business practice UCL claim based on Plaintiff’s 
tortious interference with contract claim. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s unfair business practice UCL claim with prejudice.”). 
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resulting damage.149 The court, in finding Moore sufficiently 
alleged her tortious interference with contract claim, determined 
that (1) a valid contract existed between Moore and Verizon which 
established the duty to send and receive text messages; (2) Apple 
had knowledge of Moore’s contract with Verizon; (3) Apple knew 
about the undelivered text messages issue and did not alert Moore; 
and (4) Apple’s iMessage application prevented Moore from 
fulfilling her contractual right to send and receive text 
messages.150 
Following the court’s decision to allow her case to proceed on 
the tortious interference with contract claim, Moore obtained 
documents during discovery which seemingly strengthened her 
claim.151 Moore cited internal e-mails from Google showing the 
iMessage problem persisted and Apple’s troubleshooting tips on 
solving the undelivered text message problem did not work.152 
What is more, she cited internal e-mails from Apple employees who 
were aware of the iMessage issue and apparently knew that 
Apple’s guidance on fixing the problem was ineffective.153 
Notwithstanding Moore’s additional evidence of Apple’s 
mishandling of the situation, the court later denied Moore’s motion 
for class certification under Rule 23.154 Although the court 
conceded that Moore satisfied the Article III standing requirement, 
the court denied her motion because her proposed class did not 
(1) satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement or (2) satisfy 
Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.155 Rule 23(a) requires a 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 1202–03 (evaluating whether Moore’s tortious interference 
with contract claim alleged enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing 
the plaintiff’s evidence regarding Apple’s awareness of the iMessage problem). 
 152. See id. (“Plaintiff cites internal emails from Google, Inc., from early 2015 
indicating that the iMessage problem was not only persisting, but that the 
‘iMessage deregistration tool doesn’t work.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 153. See id. (“Plaintiff also points to Apple’s own internal documents 
apparently discussing how Apple’s ‘so-called fixes’ failed to address the 
disruptions in text message delivery.”). 
 154. See id. at 549 (denying Moore’s motion for class certification because her 
“proposed class includes, by definition, proposed class members who could not 
have suffered any injury and that individualized questions with respect to 
Defendant’s liability will predominate over any common questions of law or fact”). 
 155. See id. at 548 (“In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the question of 
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common contention that “must be of such nature that it is capable 
of classwide resolution—which means the determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 
of each one of the claims in one stroke.”156 Rule 23(b)’s 
predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes are 
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation” 
and analyzes “the relationship between the common and 
individual issues in the case.”157 
The court held that Moore’s proposed class did not meet Rule 
23(a)’s commonality requirement because not every class member 
could claim they suffered the same contractual injury of not 
receiving text messages due to iMessage.158 And Moore’s proposed 
class did not meet Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement because 
the contractual variations among class members would necessitate 
individualized inquiries into each claimant’s contractual rights.159  
The court’s decision, albeit organized in separate analyses 
under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), essentially hinged on a simple 
contractual issue: members of the proposed class each had 
different cellular service contracts containing different contractual 
provisions.160 Because the members of the proposed class each had 
different cellular contracts, the court could not determine that each 
contract created the same contractual duty to send and receive text 
messages that Moore’s did.161 Consequently, because there were 
                                                                                                     
whether iMessage is the cause of any contractual breach or interference satisfies 
the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a), much less the predominance 
requirement under Rule 23(b).”). 
 156. Id. at 549. 
 157. Id. at 543. 
 158. Id. at 548–49. 
 159. Id. at 546–47. 
 160. See id. at 546  
[T]he Court finds that there are material variations in the proposed 
class members’ wireless service agreements. These individualized 
issues will predominate because determining the fact of injury will 
require evaluating the particular terms of each individual class 
member’s wireless service agreement, in order to determine whether 
Defendant actually caused a breach or interference with the 
agreement. 
 161. See id. (“[T]he Court could therefore not determine on a classwide or even 
carrier-wide basis whether individual class members were actually entitled to 
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likely members of the proposed class who did not have a 
contractual right to send and receive text messages, the proposed 
class was overbroad.162  
The court’s denial of class certification effectively ended 
Moore’s case, and without the strength of a class action lawsuit, 
she withdrew her claim after presumably reaching an out-of-court 
settlement with Apple.163 
2. Can Apple Intercept Text Messages Under the Wiretap Act?  
In Backhaut v. Apple, Inc.,164 plaintiffs Adam Backhaut, Joy 
Backhaut, and Kenneth Morris (the Backhaut plaintiffs) sued 
Apple for wrongfully intercepting and storing iMessages and 
preventing former iPhone users from receiving iMessages.165 Adam 
Backhaut and Kenneth Morris switched from iPhones to 
non-Apple devices, and alleged that after making the switch they 
failed to receive text messages sent from iPhone users.166 Joy 
Backhaut remained an iPhone user during the litigation, and she 
alleged that she sent her husband, Adam, text messages on her 
iPhone following his switch to a non-Apple device that he did not 
receive.167  
The Backhaut plaintiffs claimed Apple’s intercepting, storing, 
and withholding text messages violated the Stored 
                                                                                                     
receive text messages.”). 
 162. Id. at 543. 
 163. See Petitioner Adrienne Moore’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Petition 
for Permission to Appeal Denial of Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f) at 1, Moore v. Apple, Inc., No. 15-80209 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015) (“The parties 
have reached a resolution in this action, thereby mooting the petition to appeal.”). 
 164. 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
 165. See id. at 1037 (“The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that Apple 
wrongfully intercepts, stores, and otherwise prevents former Apple device users 
from receiving text messages sent to them from current Apple device users.”). 
 166. See id. at 1038–39 (explaining that Adam Backhaut and Kenneth Morris 
purchased non-Apple devices after using iPhones and that both had difficulties 
receiving text messages from current iPhone users). 
 167. See id. at 1038 (“Following Adam Backhaut’s switch, Plaintiff Joy 
Backhaut continued to send him text messages from her iPhone. On Joy 
Backhaut’s phone, the word ‘delivered’ appeared under her messages to her 
spouse, but Adam Backhaut never received those messages.”). 
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Communications Act,168 the Wiretap Act,169 California’s Unfair 
Competition Law (UCL),170 and California’s Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act (CLRA)171.172 The court quickly disposed of the 
Backhaut plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claim for failure 
to state a claim, CLRA claim for lack of standing, and UCL claim 
for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.173 This left 
Apple’s alleged Wiretap Act violations as the plaintiffs’ sole 
surviving claim.174 
The Backhaut plaintiffs alleged that Apple’s intentional 
interception of iPhone users’ text messages sent to former iPhone 
users violated the Wiretap Act.175 The Wiretap Act, which 
“protects communications in transit,”176 bars the “interception” of 
“wire, oral, or electronic communications” and grants a private 
cause of action against any entity who “intentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept 
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.”177 The California federal district court analyzed 
five factors to determine whether the Backhaut plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged a Wiretap Act violation: (1) whether the 
plaintiffs alleged an actionable “interception”; (2) whether Apple’s 
actions were within the “ordinary course of business exception”; 
(3) whether the plaintiffs alleged intent; (4) whether Apple’s 
                                                                                                     
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
 170. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 
Reg. Sess.). 
 171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 172. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(outlining the Backhaut plaintiffs’ causes of action). 
 173. See id. at 1052 (listing the court’s ruling on the Backhaut plaintiffs’ 
Stored Communications Act claim, the CLRA claims, and the UCL claims). 
 174. See id. (“The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Wiretap Act Claim.”). 
 175. See id. at 1042 (summarizing the Backhaut plaintiffs’ claims that gave 
rise to Apple’s alleged Wiretap Act violations). 
 176. See id. (distinguishing the Stored Communications Act, which protects 
stored communications, from the Wiretap Act, which protects communications 
that are in transit). 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); id. § 2520. 
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alleged acts fell within the statutory good faith exception to 
liability; and (5) whether the plaintiffs consented to Apple’s text 
message interceptions.178 
First, the court determined that the Backhaut plaintiffs 
alleged an actionable “interception” under the Wiretap Act because 
the plaintiffs claimed that Apple intercepted and prevented text 
messages from being delivered using a “device” and the plaintiffs 
did not direct the messages toward Apple.179 The plaintiffs’ claimed 
“interception” was Apple’s automated system of incorrectly 
categorizing messages sent to former iPhone users as iMessages 
instead of regular SMS/MMS text messages that were compatible 
with their non-Apple devices.180 Second, the court found that the 
Apple’s actions were not within the “ordinary course of business 
exception” under the Wiretap Act because the plaintiffs sufficiently 
alleged that Apple’s “interception” neither facilitated nor was 
incidental to Apple’s business of transmitting electronic 
communications.181 Third, the court determined that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged intent under the Wiretap Act because, in 
addition to outright claiming that Apple intentionally intercepted 
the text messages, the plaintiffs supported their allegation with 
information that Apple had been aware of the issue since 2012 and 
that Apple had even charged former iPhone users money to fix the 
problem.182 And fourth, the court denied Apple’s claim that its 
actions were covered by the “good faith exception” under the 
Wiretap Act because it found that Apple fundamentally 
misinterpreted the congressional intent behind the exception.183 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1042 (outlining Apple’s five arguments 
as to why the Backhaut plaintiffs did not sufficiently state a Wiretap Act violation 
claim). 
 179. See id. (explaining the court’s finding that the plaintiffs sufficiently 
alleged an actionable interception under the Wiretap Act). 
 180. See id. (clarifying the scheme the plaintiffs alleged Apple used to 
“intercept” text messages). 
 181. See id. at 1043 (explaining why Apple’s claim that its actions in 
“intercepting” text messages did not “fall within the ‘ordinary course of business’ 
exception under the Wiretap Act”). 
 182. See id. at 1044 (describing how the plaintiffs’ allegation that Apple 
intended to intercept text messages satisfied the intent requirement under the 
Wiretap Act). 
 183. See id. at 1047 (“To the extent Apple contends that Congress intended to 
allow a good faith defense in reliance on any provision of the SCA and the Wiretap 
Act, despite the explicit language of § 2520(d)(3) and § 2707(e)(3), that argument 
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Thus, the Backhaut plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim turned on the 
issue of the plaintiffs’ consent to Apple intercepting their text 
messages. Under the Wiretap Act, it is lawful to intercept 
electronic communication when a party “to the communication has 
given prior consent to such interception.”184 Apple alleged that a 
provision of the Apple iOS iPhone operating system license 
agreement, which all iPhone users (including the Backhaut 
plaintiffs) agreed to before using their iPhone and iMessage 
software, evidenced the plaintiffs’ prior consent to Apple’s 
intercepting their text messages.185 The relevant part of the 
provision read: “[t]o facilitate delivery of your iMessages and to 
enable you to maintain conversations across your devices, Apple 
may hold your iMessages in encrypted form for a limited period of 
time.”186 
At the outset, the court noted that the consent of one of the 
parties to the two-way text messaging communication was enough 
to preclude liability.187 Because the Wiretap Act requires only “one 
of the parties to the communication” give prior consent, either the 
sender or the receiver of the text message could have consented to 
Apple’s interception of the iMessages.188 However, the Backhaut 
plaintiffs (with the exception of Joy) were former iPhone owners 
who were no longer bound by Apple’s consent agreement, so the 
court’s focus shifted to whether current iMessage users, who sent 
the text messages to the Backhaut plaintiffs, actually consented to 
Apple’s intercepting their text messages.189 
                                                                                                     
is unavailing.”). 
 184. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2012). 
 185. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(analyzing Apple’s defense that the plaintiffs provided prior “consent to Apple’s 
interception of their text messages”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. (“Apple is correct that consent of one of the parties to the 
communication, here the sender, would be sufficient to preclude liability under 
the Wiretap Act.”). 
 188. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
 189. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1045 (“The Court therefore addresses 
whether current iPhone/iMessage users, like Plaintiff Joy Backhaut, have 
consented to Apple’s ‘interception’ of text messages intended for former Apple 
users.”). 
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Although Apple argued that the above-quoted provision of its 
iOS agreement proved current iMessage users consented to text 
message interception, the court disagreed.190 The court narrowly 
interpreted the provision at issue, explaining that “the license 
agreement only informs users that Apple may hold your iMessages 
in encrypted form for a limited period of time to facilitate delivery 
of your iMessages” to other iMessage users.191 Noting that consent 
is “not an all-or-nothing proposition,” the court determined that a 
reasonable user could deduce from the provision that Apple 
intercepts iMessages sent to other iMessage users, but does not 
intercept text messages sent to non-iMessage users.192 For that 
reason, the court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss the Wiretap Act 
claim based on consent.193 
Even though the Backhaut plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim 
survived Apple’s motion to dismiss, the court would later deny the 
plaintiffs’ Rule 23 motion for class certification.194 The plaintiffs 
sought both certification of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) 
and certification of an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).195 
The court refused to certify the plaintiffs’ class because (1) the 
proposed class definition was unascertainable as there was no way 
to prove proposed class members would be capable of reliable 
self-identification, and (2) the individualized inquiry required to 
                                                                                                     
 190. See id. (“Apple relies solely on the bolded language in the iOS license 
agreement in arguing that current Apple device users have consented to its 
interception.”). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at 1046 (explaining that because consent is not absolute, “Apple 
may be correct that current Apple users consent to the interception of their 
messages for the purpose of ‘facilitating’ their delivery, however, it is less clear 
that users consent to interception where such interception would guarantee 
nondelivery”). 
 193. See id. (“Taken as a whole, a reasonable user could conclude that Apple 
intercepts messages sent as iMesssages to other iMessage users, but that no such 
interception occurs if the text message cannot be sent as an iMessage. As such, 
the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Wiretap Act claim on the basis 
of consent.”). 
 194. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (“Having considered the submissions of the parties, 
the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification.”). 
 195. See id. at *3 (“Plaintiffs seek certification of a damages class under Rule 
23(b)(3) and an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).”). 
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determine whether a proposed class member impliedly consented 
to Apple’s alleged interception would predominate over any 
common questions of law or fact.196  
Perhaps the most notable takeaway from the Backhaut 
litigation is the court’s apparent waffling on the issue of consent to 
interception under the Wiretap Act.197 After scarcely mentioning 
implied consent at the motion to dismiss stage,198 the California 
federal district court reversed course and used implied consent to 
strike down the Backhaut plaintiffs’ proposed class.199 For a fact-
finder to find implied consent to interception under the Wiretap 
Act, the fact-finder need not determine whether the text message 
user had specific knowledge of Apple’s text message interceptions, 
but rather that the surrounding circumstances were enough to 
convincingly notify text message users of the interceptions.200  
Borrowing its reasoning from In re Google Inc. Gmail 
Litigation201 (hereinafter “the Gmail litigation”), the court 
determined that “broad disclosures” of information regarding the 
iMessage issue might be sufficient to put enough members of the 
proposed class on notice of the problem.202 Because enough 
                                                                                                     
 196. See id. at *16 (“[T]he court finds that Plaintiffs . . . lack standing to seek 
certification of an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2). Furthermore, the 
Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) is 
unascertainable and that individualized issues with respect to consent 
predominate over any common issues.”). 
 197. See id. at *15 (“Here, however, the predominance problems posed by 
Defendant’s implied consent defense are distinct from the express consent defense 
Defendant raised at the motion to dismiss stage.”). 
 198. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(explaining that consent under the Wiretap Act can be either express or implied, 
but it must be actual). 
 199. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427, 
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (“[T]he Court does find that the need to 
determine, on an individual-by-individual basis, whether a proposed class 
member impliedly consented to any alleged interception would predominate over 
any common questions of law or fact.”). 
 200. See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that 
“consent can only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly 
show that the party knew about and consented to the interception”). 
 201. No. 13–MD–02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014). 
 202. See id. at *20 (explaining how “a fact-finder could find implied consent 
even based on broad disclosures”). 
TEXT MESSAGES ARE PROPERTY 1107 
members of the proposed class might have been on notice of the 
iMessage problem, those members’ continued iMessage use 
(following possible notice) might mean they impliedly consented to 
the interception.203 In the Gmail litigation, seven years of regular 
nationwide media coverage of Google’s scanning customers’ 
e-mails, coupled with a “panoply” of Google’s disclosures on the 
issue, constituted “broad disclosures” on which the court based its 
finding of implied consent.204 In contrast, the “broad disclosures” of 
information regarding the iMessage problem that the court in 
Backhaut relied on to find implied consent were tech blog posts, 
tech blog comments, forum postings and comments on Apple’s 
website, and a disclosure Apple posted on its website warning 
users to deregister their iMessage before switching to a non-Apple 
device.205  
In effect, the Backhaut court found that blog posts, forum 
posts, and a single disclosure on Apple’s website were equivalent 
to seven years of nationwide media coverage and numerous 
corporate disclosures in creating a potential implied consent 
issue.206 Because the implied consent issue necessitated an inquiry 
into the actual consent of each proposed class member, the court 
found that the consent issue predominated any common questions 
of law among class members and denied the Backhaut plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification.207 
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the Backhaut decision on 
appeal.208 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the entire 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Backhaut, 2015 WL 4776427, at *14–15 (reasoning that “broad 
disclosures” of news information might have been sufficient to put members of 
the proposed class on notice of the iMessage interceptions). 
 204. See In re Gmail Litig., 2014 WL 1102660, at *18–20 (listing the sources 
of information disclosure that led the court to find that consent cannot be 
determined on a class-wide basis). 
 205. See Backhaut, 2015 WL 4776427, at *15 (listing the various sources of 
information available covering the iMessage delivery issues). 
 206. See id. (explaining that public information available concerning the 
iMessage issue might be sufficient to put iMessage users on notice because news 
articles were arguably evidence of implied consent in the Gmail litigation). 
 207. See id. (“In sum, the Court finds that the highly individualized and 
fact-specific inquiry required to determine whether a proposed class member 
impliedly consented to Defendant’s alleged interception would predominate over 
any common questions of law or fact.”). 
 208. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 15-17523, 723 Fed. Appx. 405, 407–408 
(9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) (upholding the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
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consent issue, and determined that text messages held in 
“temporary storage” are not intercepted under the Wiretap Act.209 
Additionally, the court found that the “misclassification” by the 
sender of a message as an iMessage (instead of a text message) to 
a former iPhone user caused the problem, and not Apple’s faulty 
iMessage-to-text message handoff system.210 Just as the judiciary 
has proven ineffective at protecting text message users’ rights 
against corporate overreach, the Constitution is likewise 
inadequate at protecting their rights against government 
overreach. 
B. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Text Messages: The 
Third-Party Loophole 
Our cell phones and constitutional law collide when law 
enforcement officials seek to search the contents of our cell phones 
as part of an arrest, investigation, or prosecution. Consider 
another scenario: on the day of Mark’s high school senior prom, 
someone calls in a bomb threat to Mark’s high school. Mark is sent 
home for the day along with everyone else, and much to his 
surprise the police soon show up at his front door prepared to 
arrest him for the bomb threat. 
Seven months before the bomb threat, Mark texted his friend, 
“Prom this year will be the BOMB!” Following the bomb threat, 
Mark’s cellular service provider’s linguistics algorithms flagged 
Mark’s text message for containing the words “prom” and “bomb,” 
and Mark’s third-party service provider quickly handed this text 
message off to the police.211 Solely because of Mark’s 
                                                                                                     
plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment). 
 209. See id. (“[T]he message was no longer in transmission—it was in 
temporary storage—and so under Konop could not be ‘intercepted’ within the 
meaning of the Wiretap Act.”). 
 210. See id. at 407 (finding that there was no interception, just a 
“misclassification [which] occurred when the recipient’s phone number was first 
entered in the ‘To’ field by the user of the Apple product trying to send a message. 
This misclassification occurred before any message was sent, not ‘during 
transmission’ of a message”). 
 211. See JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW 
DIGITAL SERFDOM 115 (1st ed. 2017) (outlining the process by which the 
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seven-month-old text to his friend, he just became the prime 
suspect in the bomb threat investigation. But how could the police 
read Mark’s text messages if they had no probable cause to believe 
he called in the bomb threat?  
Text messages, a protected “paper” under the Fourth 
Amendment,212 may be searched and read by the police without 
probable cause because of the third-party doctrine.213 The Fourth 
Amendment bans the government from conducting warrantless 
searches and seizures.214 This ban on government action seeks to 
strike a balance between privacy and security.215 In practice, the 
Fourth Amendment splits law enforcement conduct into two 
categories: police actions that require a warrant, and police actions 
that do not.216 The police do not need a search warrant to monitor 
occurrences in public, but the police do need a search warrant to 
monitor your home or private mail because of the Fourth 
Amendment.217 
The Constitution bars the government from warrantlessly 
searching content stored directly on your cell phone,218 as it likely 
contains more sensitive information than your entire home.219 
However, because the Fourth Amendment restricts government 
action only under the state action doctrine, private third-party 
actors (e.g., non-government companies and individuals) are not 
                                                                                                     
government obtains text messages from third parties). 
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 213. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 115 (explaining the logistics of the 
third-party doctrine). 
 214. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”). 
 215. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 574 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures is premised on a balance between privacy and security.”). 
 216. See id. (“To implement that balance, the Supreme Court has created two 
basic categories of law enforcement conduct: investigative steps that the Fourth 
Amendment regulates and those that it does not.”). 
 217. See id. (comparing the actions the police need a search warrant for to the 
actions the police do not need a search warrant for). 
 218. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014) (extending the 
Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizures to data within a cell 
phone). 
 219. See id. at 398 (2014) (“[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”). 
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constitutionally barred from searching the contents of your cell 
phone.220 Thus, the Constitution restricts the government from 
searching the contents of your cell phone, but there is no 
equivalent law that restricts the private sector from conducting a 
search that would be illegal if a government actor performed it. 
This inconsistency has been termed the “third-party loophole,” or 
the “third-party doctrine.”221  
Under the third-party doctrine, an individual who voluntarily 
conveys information to a third party (e.g., a cellular service 
provider) maintains no reasonable expectation of privacy.222 Put 
another way, if a consumer voluntarily reveals information to a 
business, the consumer takes the risk that the business will give 
that information to the government.223 Normally, the government 
cannot search something someone reasonably expects to be 
private, but once someone conveys that interest to a third party, 
their reasonable expectation of privacy is lost.224 Thus, the 
third-party loophole allows the government to freely obtain 
consumer electronic communications from cellular service 
providers that the government would not otherwise be able to 
gather without a warrant.225 
Although courts historically applied the third-party doctrine 
to a discrete set of records-related categories,226 in modern-day 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 613 (2015) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does 
not stop private companies from conducting searches and seizures). 
 221. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 115–16 (discussing the third-party 
exception to data searches and naming it the “third-party loophole”). 
 222. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court 
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 223. See id. at 745 (explaining that because the petitioner voluntarily 
conveyed information to a business, the “petitioner assumed the risk that the 
information would be divulged to police”). 
 224. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor 
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.”). 
 225. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 220, at 613 (discussing how the 
third-party doctrine enables the government to get around the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement). 
 226. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07–CR–0023–MHS/AJB, 2008 
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jurisprudence, the third-party doctrine has evolved into a single 
test: if any information is disclosed to a third party, then that 
information becomes public and it is not entitled to the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.227 This has led to a drastic 
expansion of the government’s ability to obtain information.228 By 
analogy, the government previously used the third-party doctrine 
to read the address written on the outside of a sealed letter; now, 
the government uses the same doctrine to read the contents of the 
letter itself.229  
Even if a user conveys information to a third party 
confidentially and under the assumption that the third party will 
use it for only limited purposes, the information nonetheless loses 
its Fourth Amendment protection.230 For example, the third-party 
doctrine allows the government to, without a warrant, request the 
contents of e-mails sent through the Google’s e-mail platform 
“Gmail,” because Gmail users agreed to allow Google read the 
contents of their e-mails.231 Gmail users might expect that Google 
will keep the contents of their e-mails confidential, but because 
                                                                                                     
WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (categorizing the third-party doctrine 
as applying to six situations: “(1) bank records; (2) credit card statements; (3) 
kilowatt consumption from electric utility records; (4) motel registration records; 
(5) cell phone records; and (6) employment records”). 
 227. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth 
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1931 
(2017) (explaining that the modern third-party doctrine “has calcified into a 
binary one, in which any information disclosed to a third party for any reason is 
public and does not merit Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 228. See Kerr, supra note 215, at 587 (explaining how a common criticism of 
the third-party doctrine is that “it gives the government too much power”). 
 229. See id. (comparing the government’s past use of the third-party doctrine 
to the government’s current use of the doctrine). 
 230. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by the third party to government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed to the third party confidentially 
and on the assumption that it will be used only for limited purposes.”). 
 231. See GOOGLE, PRIVACY POLICY (2017), 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf 
(“Our automated systems analyze your content (including emails) to provide you 
personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored 
advertising, and spam and malware detection.”). 
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Gmail users allow Google to read the contents of their e-mails,232 
the government does not need a warrant to access the e-mails.233 
Congress tried to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections of electronic communications with the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA).234 However, the SCA merely provides 
temporary Fourth Amendment protection of electronic 
communications stored on third-party servers.235 Under the SCA, 
once text messages stored on a third-party server are greater than 
180 days old, the government is no longer required to obtain a 
warrant with probable cause to access the text messages.236 Apple, 
for instance, stores iPhone users’ iMessages and SMS messages on 
its iCloud servers.237 Consequently, after an iPhone user’s text 
message is more than 180 days old, the SCA does not protect that 
text message, and the government may compel Apple to disclose 
the text message even though no warrant has been issued.238 
                                                                                                     
 232. Id. 
 233. See Note, supra note 227, at 1931 (using Google as an example of a 
situation in which “it is not difficult to imagine that one would want and expect 
to be able to keep some information private in certain respects but not in others”). 
 234. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection 
Erodes as E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1072 (2008) (“Congress passed 
the ECPA in 1986 to draw clear lines as to where Fourth Amendment protection 
extends with emerging technologies.”). 
 235. See id. at 1044–45 (explaining that digital messages stored on a third 
party server are no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act after they are 
over 180 days old). 
 236. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by 
the means available under subsection (b).”); id. (outlining how “[a] governmental 
entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents 
of any wire or electronic communication” with delayed notice pursuant to Section 
2705); id. § 2705 (describing the process the government can take to indefinitely 
delay notifying the customer whose electronic communications the government 
searched pursuant to § 2703(a)). 
 237. See Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“iMessage and SMS messages are backed up on 
iCloud for your convenience, but you can turn iCloud Backup off whenever you 
want.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 238. See Oza, supra note 234, at 1044–45 (explaining how once electronic 
communications are stored for greater than 180 days on a third-party server, the 
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In sum, as we store nearly our entire digital lives on 
third-party, cloud-based servers in one way or another,239 the 
third-party loophole has crippled the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection over stored communications.240 Although this paints a 
bleak picture for consumers hoping to keep the government from 
intruding into their private text message inbox, a potential stopgap 
exists in an area of law much more ancient than the electronic 
devices and data at issue: property law.241 
V. The Solution is Property Law  
This Part argues that text messages constitute intangible 
personal property.242 This leads to two separate practical 
outcomes: first, plaintiffs such as those in the Moore and Backhaut 
cases would have been successful had they sued Apple under 
property-based causes of action;243 and second, text messages, as 
property, should receive increased Fourth Amendment protections 
against warrantless searches, thus closing the third-party 
loophole.244  
A. Text Messages Are Property 
Under Kremen, text messages constitute an intangible 
personal property if they are (1) “an interest capable of precise 
definition”; (2) “capable of exclusive possession or control”; and (3) 
there is a “legitimate claim to exclusivity.”245  
                                                                                                     
electronic communications are no longer protected by the ECPA’s probable cause 
requirement). 
 239. See Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to 
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 524 (2017) 
(discussing the proliferation of information stored on the cloud). 
 240. See Oza, supra note 234, at 1044–45 (“As more of our personal 
information is electronically stored on third-party servers, this exception 
threatens to nullify the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 241. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 114 (arguing that the law of property 
trespass should pick up for third parties where the Fourth Amendment stops). 
 242. Infra Part V.A. 
 243. Infra Part V.B. 
 244. Infra Part V.C. 
 245. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (outlining the 
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First, text messages are an interest capable of precise 
definition because the text within the message itself is precisely 
worded for the recipient.246 Although there is not a theoretically 
finite amount of text messages in the same way there are a limited 
amount of domain names or plots of land, each text message sent 
is a unique interaction between the sender and receiver at the time 
and place of its sending that cannot be recreated by others.247  
Second, text messages are capable of exclusive possession and 
control because cell phone owners have sole possession of the text 
messages they have sent and received on their own personal 
devices.248 A cell phone owner has exclusive possession and control 
over the messages contained within their cell phone’s text message 
application.249  
Finally, text message owners have a legitimate claim to 
exclusivity over their text messages because encryption and phone 
security features protect the messages and ensure the content of 
the messages remains private between the sender and receiver.250 
Some courts, in addition to applying some form of the Kremen 
test, also require the intangible personal property to have a basis 
in a tangible property.251 This means that the digital “thing” has to 
have some sort of a connection to a physical object, but the owner 
                                                                                                     
Ninth Circuit’s three-part test to determine whether a digital object constitutes 
an intangible personal property). 
 246. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining 
the process by which a user sends a text message to the recipient). 
 247. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (determining that a domain name is a 
well-defined interest by likening it to “a share of corporate stock or a plot of land”). 
 248. See id. (finding that a domain name owner has exclusive possession and 
control of the domain name because the domain name registrant alone makes the 
decision on what domain to purchase). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. (“[R]egistrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering 
a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs 
others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.”). 
 251. See, e.g., Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 
16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL 4413288, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (“[M]any 
courts have applied trespass to chattels to actions taken in cyberspace. But there 
is no consensus among the courts. Some courts found personal intangible property 
is chattel. Other courts concluded trespass to chattel, including a claim related to 
intangible property, must have a connection to tangible property.”). 
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need not have control over the physical object.252 Although this 
might be a tough element for other cloud-based forms of intangible 
property, such as e-mails, to overcome, text messages easily 
surpass this threshold. Text messages are connected to, and stored 
directly on, the one object everyone has within an arm’s length at 
all times: cellular phones.253 And if an argument is made that the 
text messages themselves are not stored within the phone but 
rather stored on servers scattered around the world (the “cloud”), 
it makes no difference, as the servers themselves are tangible 
property.254  
Consequently, text messages constitute a form of intangible 
personal property. The recent uptick in federal courts finding that 
e-mails constitute personal property signals that it will not be long 
until courts determine that text messages are property.255 With 
that in mind, would the iMessage plaintiffs have succeeded had 
they brought claims based on the theory that their text messages 
were their property? 
B. Why the iMessage Plaintiffs Should Have Succeeded 
The iMessage cases share similar facts: former iPhone users 
sued Apple, alleging that Apple interfered with their receiving text 
messages after they switched to a non-Apple cellular device.256 The 
iMessage cases even share the same judge, as Judge Lucy H. Koh 
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
                                                                                                     
 252. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1033 (“Assuming arguendo that California 
retains some vestigial merger requirement, it is clearly minimal, and at most 
requires only some connection to a document or tangible object—not 
representation of the owner’s intangible interest in the strict Restatement 
sense.”). 
 253. See Ellen Brait, Smash It, Shred It, Wipe It: The Tom Brady Guide to 
Destroying Text Messages, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2015, 12:47 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/29/tom-brady-deflategate-
destroy-text-messages-cellphone (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining how text 
messages are stored both on cell phones themselves and also stored on cellular 
service providers’ servers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Supra notes 118–126 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore 
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background). 
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authored both opinions.257 And, unfortunately, the iMessage cases 
also share similar results: the plaintiffs lost at the class 
certification stage.258  
Would the outcome have been different if the plaintiffs 
pursued a trespass to chattels or conversion cause of action against 
Apple? This subpart applies the intangible personal property 
theory to the iMessage litigation’s facts: first, the court would 
decide whether the plaintiffs had a valid trespass to chattels or 
conversion claim;259 and second, the court would determine 
whether to certify the plaintiffs’ proposed class action lawsuit.260 
1. As Property, Text Messages Can Be Converted or Trespassed 
Upon 
As established, text messages constitute a form of property 
under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Kremen.261 The hypothetical 
court would initially determine whether the text message property 
was taken (conversion) or disrupted (trespass to chattels).262 Using 
the iMessage litigation as our facts, where Apple blocked former 
iMessage users from receiving text messages after the former users 
switched to non-Apple devices, the former iMessage users would 
likely prevail (at least individually) on both a trespass to chattels 
claim and a conversion claim against Apple.263 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore 
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background). 
 258. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore case’s 
conclusion following the court’s refusal to certify the class); supra notes 208–210 
and accompanying text (discussing the Backhaut case’s conclusion following the 
plaintiffs’ unsuccessful appeal). 
 259. Infra Part V.A.1. 
 260. Infra Part IV.A.2. 
 261. Supra Part IV.A. 
 262. See Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Sprint Lumber, No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS, 
2017 WL 4413288, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (explaining how before the court 
can determine if a trespass to chattels occurred, the court must determine 
whether e-mails fall within the definition of a chattel). 
 263. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore 
case’s factual background); supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text 
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Under California law, “a trespass to chattels claim lies where 
(1) an intentional interference with (2) the possession of personal 
property has (3) proximately caused injury.”264 First, the courts in 
the iMessage litigation found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged 
that Apple likely intended to slow down or delay the messages sent 
from iPhone users to former iPhone users because it was aware of 
the problem and did not act to fix it.265 Second, Apple interfered 
with possession of the iMessage users’ property because Apple’s 
actions delayed and prevented the former iPhone owners from 
possessing and receiving their text messages.266  
The third prong, whether Apple proximately caused injury by 
intercepting and withholding the text messages, is the most 
challenging to establish. In California, specifically in the context of 
a computer or digital system, “injury is adequately alleged where 
the plaintiff pleads that the purported trespass deprived plaintiff 
of the use of personal property for a substantial time.”267 The 
plaintiffs in the iMessage litigation never received the missing text 
messages from iMessage users who attempted to text message 
them after they switched to non-Apple devices.268 Although Apple 
could argue that its iMessage deregistration system takes effect 
after forty-eight hours, the plaintiffs did not register for this 
system before switching to non-Apple devices, and thus the 
deregistration issue is moot.269  
                                                                                                     
(discussing the Backhaut case’s factual background). 
 264. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350–51 (Cal. 2003). 
 265. See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“Plaintiffs have alleged that Apple knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately 
intercepted text messages. On a motion to dismiss, these allegations are 
sufficient.”). 
 266. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“Plaintiff alleges that Apple failed to disclose that use of iMessage and Messages 
would result in undelivered messages if an iPhone user switched to a non-Apple 
device.”). 
 267. Grace v. Apple Inc., No. 17-CV-00551, 2017 WL 3232464, at *11 (N.D. 
Cal. July 28, 2017). 
 268. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (“Following Adam Backhaut’s 
switch, Plaintiff Joy Backhaut continued to send him text messages from her 
iPhone. On Joy Backhaut’s phone, the word ‘delivered’ appeared under her 
messages to her spouse, but Adam Backhaut never received those messages.”). 
 269. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1196 (“Plaintiff noticed she was not 
receiving text messages she expected to receive from users of Apple devices. After 
this initial discovery, Plaintiff contacted her service provider, Verizon Wireless, 
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When Apple failed to deliver the text messages to the 
former iMessage users in the iMessage litigation, it injured 
the plaintiffs because it deprived them of the use of their 
property for a substantial time.270 Thus, because Apple 
intentionally interfered with the former iMessage users’ text 
messages and proximately caused injury, the plaintiffs in the 
iMessage litigation would have likely succeeded in their 
trespass to chattels claim against Apple. 
To establish the tort of conversion, the iMessage 
plaintiffs must show (1) that they owned the text messages; 
(2) that Apple’s actions constituted a wrongful disposition of 
a property right; and (3) damages.271 As established above, 
text messages constitute intangible personal property, so the 
iMessage plaintiffs satisfy the first “property” prong. The 
iMessage plaintiffs should succeed in proving that Apple’s 
interception of the text messages constituted a wrongful 
disposition of a property right, as the plaintiffs never received 
their text messages.272 And the plaintiffs will satisfy the 
damages requirement because their cellular contracts 
guaranteed the plaintiffs the right to send text messages, and 
Apple’s interference with the text messages deprived the 
plaintiffs of the “full benefit of [their] contractual bargain.”273 
Thus, the iMessage plaintiffs would have likely succeeded 
had they brought a conversion cause of action against Apple.  
                                                                                                     
which informed her that she needed to ‘turn off’ Messages on her old iPhone.”). 
 270. See Grace, 2017 WL 3232464, at *13 (finding that the FaceTime plaintiffs 
satisfied the injury element because they sufficiently alleged “that Apple’s 
disabling of FaceTime ‘impaired the condition, quality, or value’ of their iPhones” 
(quoting Fields v. Wise Media, LLC, No. C 12-05160 WHA, 2013 WL 5340490, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2013))). 
 271. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To establish 
[conversion], a plaintiff must show ownership or right to possession of property, 
wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.”).  
 272. See Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (explaining how a plaintiff never 
received the missing text messages). 
 273. See Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“Plaintiff alleges that Apple’s interference with the receipt of her text messages 
deprived her of the full benefit of her contractual bargain with Verizon 
Wireless.”). 
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2. The Final Step: Class Certification 
Taking our hypothetical iMessage litigation to its conclusion, 
the final step, following the iMessage plaintiffs’ successful 
individual trespass to chattels or conversion claims against Apple, 
would be the class certification stage. Judge Koh might well deny 
class certification again, as she has turned Rule 23(b)(3) damages 
class certification into a nearly impenetrable barrier for plaintiffs 
to break through.274 However, the iMessage plaintiffs’ novel 
property-based causes of action, combined with Judge Koh’s 
comparative leniency toward Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class 
certifications, gives the iMessage plaintiffs a realistic chance at 
clearing the class certification hurdle.275 Moreover, injunctive 
relief would better serve the iMessage plaintiffs’ goals, as the court 
could, in effect, force Apple to deliver the missing text messages to 
former iMessage users right away.276 As the court already found 
that the iMessage litigants satisfied Article III standing, the court 
would analyze whether the plaintiffs met the requirements for an 
injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2).277 
To establish an injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2), the 
iMessage plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered a “concrete 
and particularized” harm and that they are “subject to a likelihood 
of future injury.”278 Although the plaintiffs in Backhaut failed in 
                                                                                                     
 274. See Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2016 WL 7428810, 
at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ proposed classes because they 
did not meet the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement); In re Google Inc. 
Gmail Litig., No. 13– MD– 02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
18, 2014) (finding that the plaintiffs did not meet “their burden of demonstrating 
that the proposed classes satisfy the [Rule 23(b)(3)] predominance requirement”); 
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11– CV–02509–LHK, 2013 WL 
1352016, at *587 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (denying plaintiffs’ class certification 
because the proposed class did not meet the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
requirement). 
 275. See In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for an injunctive class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2)). 
 276. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
729, 734 (2013) (explaining how injunctive claims can be the most important part 
of a class action). 
 277. See Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 541 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“In sum, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the standing requirements under 
Article III.”). 
 278. See Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14–CV–02285–LHK, 2015 WL 4776427, 
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their attempt to certify an injunctive class because they could not 
prove a threat of future injury,279 the plaintiffs in Moore obtained 
internal Apple documents through discovery that proved Apple 
was aware that “hundreds of former iPhone users reported 
attempting deactivation but were still not receiving text messages 
from Apple device users.”280 And while the Moore case turned on 
the issue of reading every single proposed class member’s contract 
to determine whether there had indeed been a “harm,” the harm 
question under a conversion or trespass to chattels theory would 
be much simpler: Did the proposed class members fail to receive 
text messages they were supposed to?281 Yes.282 Therefore, the 
plaintiffs would have probably succeeded in certifying an 
injunctive class because the plaintiffs could use Apple’s knowledge 
of the problem to prove both present harm and future harm.283 
That is why, if iMessage plaintiffs brought either trespass to 
chattels or conversion claims against Apple for Apple’s disrupting 
their text message delivery, and if the court agreed that text 
messages constitute intangible personal property, the result would 
have been different. The plaintiffs would have certified their Rule 
                                                                                                     
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (outlining the requirements necessary “to establish 
standing for injunctive relief”). 
 279. See id. at *8–9 (explaining how each of the Backhaut plaintiffs have 
either started using iPhones again or begun receiving text messages from current 
iPhone users, indicating that there was no risk of future harm). 
 280. See Moore, 309 F.R.D. at 537 (reviewing internal documents “apparently 
discussing how Apple’s ‘so-called fixes’ failed to address the disruptions in text 
message delivery”). 
 281. See In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07–05152 JW, 2010 WL 
3521965, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010), vacated in part, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168 
(2011) (explaining that certifying an injunctive class is appropriate if the 
plaintiffs prove that, should they succeed on the merits, injunctive relief would be 
“reasonably necessary and appropriate”). 
 282. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1196 (“Plaintiff is not the only former Apple 
device user to encounter the problem of undelivered text messages. ‘[C]ountless’ 
former Apple device users have not received messages sent by Apple device 
users.”). 
 283. See Moore, 309 F.D.R. at 542 (denying class certification because the 
plaintiff’s proposed class included “individuals who did not pay or contract for text 
messaging services,” and were thus not harmed by Apple’s withholding their text 
messages). 
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23(b)(2) injunctive class.284 Apple would have then been forced to 
begin delivering text messages sent to former iMessage users. And 
current iPhone owners might even feel comfortable leaving Apple’s 
“walled garden” ecosystem to try out a competitor’s cellular device 
without fear that Apple will “lose” text messages meant for 
them.285  
C. Why the Third-Party Loophole Will Begin to Close 
Recall that the third-party loophole is the exception that 
enables the government to obtain consumer information from 
companies without a search warrant.286 Although the Fourth 
Amendment bars the government from searching the contents of 
your cell phone without a warrant, the Constitution does not bar 
the government from searching the same exact information when 
it is stored on the cloud instead of your cell phone.287 While courts 
have begun closing the third-party loophole as it pertains to 
e-mails sent through and stored with internet service providers 
(ISPs), courts have not shown the same willingness to protect text 
messages stored on the cloud and sent through wireless service 
providers.288  
Classifying text messages as property closes the third-party 
loophole for two reasons. First, text message owners manifest their 
                                                                                                     
 284. See In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 3521965, at *14 
(certifying the proposed injunctive class because the plaintiffs proved that 
“injunctive relief from the challenged conduct would be reasonably necessary and 
appropriate if Plaintiffs succeed on the merits”). 
 285. See supra notes 132–137 and accompanying text (describing iPhone 
users who feel locked in to their device and unable to switch to another type of 
cell phone because of iMessage). 
 286. Supra Part II.B. 
 287. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014) (extending 
constitutional “probable cause” protection to information stored within a cell 
phone). 
 288. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 
288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that because “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of emails” sent or stored with ISPs, “[t]he 
government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a 
subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause”). 
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intent to prevent third parties and the government from reading 
the content of their encrypted property.289 This “intent to prevent” 
is at odds with the third-party doctrine’s theory that an individual 
who voluntarily conveys information to a third party has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.290  
Extending personal property protections to text messages 
introduces a different legal theory relevant to determining 
whether the text messages can be searched without a warrant: the 
“container doctrine.”291 Under the container doctrine, courts give 
seemingly-abandoned personal property contained within a secure 
container greater constitutional protections against warrantless 
searches because the act of securing personal property shows the 
owner’s express manifest intent to keep the property protected.292 
Text messages, an intangible personal property, are placed outside 
of their owner’s control when they are stored on the cloud.293 And 
                                                                                                     
 289. See David Kravets, Here’s A Good Reason to Encrypt Your Data, WIRED 
(Apr. 23, 2013, 6:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/encrypt-your-data/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining that a “top reason” to encrypt data “is to keep 
the government out of your hard drive”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 290. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding that one 
has no expectation of privacy in information handed over to third parties). 
 291. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 127 (“[O]utside of the owner’s 
possession or control, the property can be considered abandoned, at least for 
privacy purposes, and thus can be searched. This is the abandonment doctrine. 
On the other hand, property placed inside containers has historically been given 
much stronger protection from searches and seizures.”). 
 292. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 (1977)  
By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, 
respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain 
free from public examination. No less than one who locks the doors of 
his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal 
possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Clause. There being no exigency, it was 
unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search without the 
safeguards a judicial warrant provides. 
 293. See FAIRFIELD, supra note 211, at 128 (explaining how “[t]he very 
purpose of [digital] assets is that they are [stored] away from their owners but not 
out of their owners’ control”). 
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remember that Apple stores copies of all iMessage and SMS 
communications on the cloud.294 AT&T and Verizon do too.295  
The classic example of property receiving greater protections 
against warrantless searches is a padlocked box, whose owner 
manifested an intent to keep the property protected by locking the 
box.296 By analogy, a text message owner should receive 
heightened protections against warrantless searches because the 
owner, by “locking” the contents of the text message with 
encryption technology, has manifested an intent to keep the 
property protected, even if Apple stores a copy of the text message 
on an iCloud server outside the possession of its owner.  
Text message users rely on iMessage’s end-to-end encryption 
to keep their text messages secure both in the cloud and in 
transit.297 Also, most text message users rely on their smartphone’s 
lock screen to keep unwanted intruders out of their text message 
inbox.298 Encryption, coupled with smartphone security features, 
serve as the text message user’s manifest intent and expectation 
that their text messages be secure against unwanted intrusions.  
                                                                                                     
 294. See Privacy, supra note 237 (“iMessage and SMS messages are backed 
up on iCloud for your convenience, but you can turn iCloud Backup off whenever 
you want.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 295. See AT&T Privacy Policy, AT&T, 
http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy/terms#collect (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) 
(“We may collect different types of information based on your use of our products 
and services and on our business relationship with you. Examples of this might 
include . . . the number of text messages sent and received . . . [and] calling and 
texting records.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Privacy 
Policy, VERIZON (Jan. 2018), http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/full-privacy-
policy (last updated April 2018) (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (“We collect 
information when you communicate with us and when you use our products, 
services and sites.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 296. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 (“By placing personal effects inside a 
double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the 
contents would remain free from public examination.”). 
 297. See About iMessage and SMS/MMS, APPLE (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207006 (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (explaining 
the security differences between iMessages and SMS text messages) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 298. See Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2019) (outlining how 72% of smartphone users “use a screen lock 
or other security features” to secure their devices) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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A text message owner’s plainly evident intent to prevent 
unwanted intrusions during transit and storage does not square 
with the third-party doctrine’s legal fiction that the same text 
message owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy if she 
sends her text message through a cellular service provider. The 
opposite is true. A text message owner’s intent to prevent 
unwanted intrusions into her text message property proves her 
reasonable expectation of privacy.299 Consequently, as the text 
message owner retains her reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to the text message’s content during transit and storage, 
the third-party loophole closes because the government cannot 
collect information which has not been disclosed to the third party.  
Second, text messages, as a form of property and not merely 
confidential information, are encrypted to prevent third parties 
from viewing the text message’s content.300 Instead of traveling 
through cyberspace as an open book, the encrypted text message 
travels under lock and key, and thus the content within is at no 
point conveyed to the cellular service provider.301 Because a 
third-party service provider never sees the content hidden by 
encryption, the text message’s content is never revealed to the 
service provider.  
If the content remains hidden behind encryption, then the text 
message user has not voluntarily conveyed the content to the 
provider because the provider does not see the content.302 As well, 
the service provider cannot claim it saw the text message’s content 
confidentially because it never saw the content at all.303 Cellular 
                                                                                                     
 299. See Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that the government may not collect e-mails under the third-party 
doctrine because the e-mail users retained their reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 300. See Kopfstein, infra note 304 (explaining why Apple encrypts iMessages). 
 301. See id. (describing iMessage’s end-to-end encryption and how it (in 
theory) means that only the sender and the recipient will read the message’s 
content). 
 302. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court 
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 303. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that one’s expectation of confidentiality with regard to information 
shared with third parties has no bearing on the information’s Fourth Amendment 
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service providers are not meant to read any of the text message’s 
content—even if they do anyway—by virtue of the text message 
remaining sealed (encrypted) in transit and during storage.304 So, 
because a text message owner does not convey the content of the 
text message to the cellular service provider, confidentially or 
otherwise, the government cannot get the text message’s content 
using the third-party loophole.305 
Just as the government cannot open up a sealed letter and 
read its contents without a warrant, the government should be 
prevented from opening up encrypted text messages, whether 
stored or in transit, without a warrant.306 Although the framers 
had sealed letters in mind when adopting the Fourth Amendment, 
there is hardly a more appropriate modern analogy than an 
encrypted text message.307 
VI. Conclusion 
Courts have yet to consider whether text messages constitute 
intangible personal property, but they will soon. As our lives 
                                                                                                     
protections).  
 304. See Janus Kopfstein, Apple Can Still See Your iMessages If You Enable 
iCloud, VICE (Jan. 22, 2016, 4:10 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/78kv7b/psa-apple-can-still-see-your-
imessages-if-you-enable-icloud (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)  
It turns out the privacy benefits Apple likes to talk about (and the FBI 
likes to complain about) basically disappear when iCloud Backup is 
enabled. Your messages, photos and whatnot are still protected while 
on your device and encrypted end-to-end while in transit. But you’re 
also telling your device to CC Apple on everything. Those copies are 
encrypted on iCloud using a key controlled by Apple, not you, allowing 
the company (and thus anyone who gets access to your account) to see 
their contents.  
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 305. See id. (“Apple can’t read messages sent between Apple devices because 
they’re encrypted end-to-end, decipherable only by you and the intended 
recipient.”). 
 306. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1308 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]he framers were concerned with the protection of physical rather than virtual 
correspondence. But a more obvious analogy from principle to new technology is 
hard to imagine and, indeed, many courts have already applied the common law’s 
ancient trespass to chattels doctrine to electronic, not just written, 
communications.”). 
 307. Id. 
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become more and more centered around our smartphones, text 
messages will displace e-mails as the primary means of electronic 
communication (if that hasn’t already happened). We currently do 
not have an effective means of recourse available should our 
cellular providers purposefully block or delete our text messages.  
The answer lies in property law. Text messages constitute 
intangible personal property, and text message owners can, 
therefore, sue using traditional property law causes of action such 
as trespass to chattels or conversion. Although there have been few 
legal challenges brought by aggrieved text message owners, they 
have been universally unsuccessful in causing cellular providers to 
change their ways.308 Had these aggrieved text message owners 
sued under a property-based cause of action, they would have 
successfully enjoined the cellular providers from continuing to 
mess with their text messages.  
Moreover, a judicial determination that text messages 
constitute intangible personal property will close the third-party 
loophole. As it stands, the government is free to search the contents 
of our text messages because we have voluntarily conveyed the 
information to our cellular service providers.309 However, if courts 
find that text messages constitute a form of property, an encrypted 
text message starts to look more and more like a sealed letter than 
it does public information. The framers designed the Fourth 
Amendment to prevent unwarranted searches and seizures of the 
dominant form of communication of their day: sealed letters. 
Consequently, it makes sense to extend the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection only to the dominant form of communication today: 
encrypted text messages. 
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